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We discuss  the scientific task of historical reconstruction and the problem of epistemic 
access. We argue that strong epistemic support for historical claims consists  in the 
consilience of multiple independent lines  of evidence, and analyze the impact hypothesis 
for the End-Cretaceous  mass  extinction to illustrate the accrual of epistemic support. 
Although there are elements  of the impact hypothesis  that enjoy strong epistemic 
support, the general conditions  for this  are strict, and help to clarify the difficulties 
associated with reconstructing the deep past. 
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1. Introduction
Of the many tasks  undertaken in science, one is  striking both in its  scope and the epistemic difficulties  it 
faces: the reconstruction of the deep past. Such reconstruction provides  the resources  to successfully explain 
puzzling extant traces, from fossils  to radiation signatures, often in the absence of extensive and repeatable 
observations—the hallmark of good epistemic support. Yet good explanations  do not come for free. 
Evidence can fail, in practice or in principle, to support one hypothesis  over another (underdetermination). 
And when hypotheses do confront conflicting evidence, identifying the piece of theory to abandon can be 
notoriously difficult (testing holism). Good science, in any discipline, must overcome these challenges. 
Our epistemic access  to past events  is  limited, often severely so. Despite the problem of access, some 
claims  about prehistory enjoy strong epistemic support. Here we will analyze the problem of epistemic 
access  for historical reconstruction (§ 2). We will then review a familiar case of successful historical inquiry, 
the impact hypothesis  for the End-Cretaceous mass  extinction, to clarify how epistemic support accrues  to 
historical hypotheses (§§ 3–5). We argue that the convergence of independent evidential inferences, a kind of 
consilience (Whewell 1858), provides the primary source of support for such historical reconstructions. We 
will argue that the nature of epistemic support is  the same or similar across  the sciences. The specific 
strategies  for the accrual of epistemic support differ, due to differences  in the severity of the epistemic 
problems different lines of  inquiry face.
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2. The Problem of  Access  
The task of historical reconstruction involves  crafting a causal etiology for a specific event or set of 
events.1 Historical reconstructions  provide both a chronology and a history. The chronology identifies the 
temporal sequence of events, whereas  the history identifies  the causal links  and processes  connecting events 
across  time. Often historical events  are unique, and the causal reconstruction can vary in scope from vast 
(the evolution of the vertebrate eye) to minute (the exact cause of a mechanical failure). We usually cannot 
conduct repeatable experiments, nor can we observe multiple repetitions. Thus, reconstructing histories and 
chronologies faces, as does all scientific inquiry, a problem of  access. 
Limits  to epistemic access  cause underdetermination problems. An underdetermination problem occurs 
when available data and various  features  of competing hypotheses fail to adjudicate a theory choice 
according to a specific set of decision criteria (Dietrich and Skipper 2007). Underdetermination problems 
are persistent and pervasive for the task of historical reconstruction. Indeed, much effort is  devoted to 
overcoming these problems. Turner (2005, 220–222) gives  several examples from paleobiology and geology 
where we lack the necessary evidence to discriminate between scientifically serious alternative hypotheses. 
Forber (2009, 257–263) analyzes  an empirically estimated adaptive landscape, revealing how changes  to 
demographic or ecological assumptions  about the microevolutionary process  alter the landscapes, and thus 
demonstrates how fragile the evidential assessment of  existing data can be..
While all science must confront underdetermination, historical reconstruction often lacks important 
epistemic recourses  available to other lines  of inquiry. When reconstructing history we lack the ability to 
intervene experimentally to test hypothesized causal relationships  among events  in the past. Moreover, our 
inability to reproduce or observe repetitions  of most historical events ensures that historical reconstruction, 
unlike tasks  involving the identification and testing of regularities, is  limited by restricted sources of data. 
While other areas  of scientific inquiry (e.g., celestial mechanics or the structure of the earth) have achieved 
substantial progress  in the face of an inability to intervene experimentally, the task of historical 
reconstruction faces  a further epistemic difficulty: the traces  of a past event are subject to disturbance by 
heterogeneous  causal processes  over long spans  of time, biasing or destroying information extractable from 
residual traces  of the past event. Due to these difficulties, historical reconstruction typically proceeds  without 
sources  of replicable data that are insulated from information biasing or destruction. Such data allow science 
to refine and revise theory to a high degree of precision, to “close the loop” between successive 
approximations and the phenomena (Smith 2008).  
Although the discovery of new residual traces, the advent of new technologies, and the refinement of 
statistical techniques  may all bring new forms  of evidence to bear on a historical question, these data are still 
subject—to varying degrees—to the effects  of intervening information-destroying processes. Thus, as  Turner 
(2007) notes, the extractable information of all remaining residual traces  may not be sufficient to determine 
many aspects of past events, causing underdetermination problems. Perhaps  of more concern, information 
destruction raises  the possibility that the fragmentary nature of the available traces  might be systematically 
misleading. 
The extent of the epistemic limitations  introduced by information-destroying processes  depends  on the 
detailed circumstances  of their operation and on the kind of historical information we aim to collect. In 
evolutionary biology we know that directional natural selection tends  to eliminate variation, and so destroys 
information about what variants were historically available during the evolution of a lineage. It also tends  to 
move populations  to (local) optima, and so destroys  information about ancestral trait values  and genealogical 
relationships.2 But on the molecular level natural selection and common ancestry can leave definite 
signatures  across  the genome. For instance, while strong directional selection destroys information about 
variation and the ancestral trait value on the morphological level, these selective sweeps  usually leave 
detectable signatures  in the genome. Of course, the information in sequence data can be destroyed too, and 
there are limits  to how much historical information a sequence can contain. In the extreme case, since there 
are only four DNA bases, two (neutral) pseudogenes will, after sufficient evolutionary time, be on average 
25% similar. At this  saturation point evolution has  obliterated any extractable information about common 
ancestry or evolutionary process. Sober and Steel (2002, 398) use information theory to calculate the upper 
FORBER AND  GRIFFITH — HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION
OPEN ACCESS - Freely Available at philosophyandtheoryinbiology.org
3
limit on the information about evolutionary history contained in a dataset. Their framework, or another like 
it, could be applied to molecular sequences  to determine just how far back in time we can reconstruct 
chronology and history.
How frequently these epistemic limitations  create actual underdetermination problems, however, is 
unclear. Jeffares  (2010) provides many reasons  to resist such skepticism, for our apparent access  to the past 
continues to improve. To take a single telling example, Turner (2007) cites  the coloration of dinosaurs  as  an 
illustration of an unanswerable question about the past. In contrast, a recent study claims to identify the 
plumage color patterns  for a late Jurassic theropod dinosaur (Li et al. 2010). While the frequency issue is 
important, the hard question remains: with no way to test any claim against the actual event in real time, 
how can epistemic support accrue to historical claims such that they become more than mere just-so stories?
Some (Cleland 2001; 2002; Jeffares  2008), following up a powerful idea discussed in geology, argue that 
a “smoking gun”—an extant trace that definitively supports one hypothesis  over its  rivals—provides  the 
main source of epistemic support for historical hypotheses. On this  view, a smoking gun constitutes  a 
naturally occurring experimentum crucis: 
Take multiple observations  of evidence: [oa,ob,oc]. Now take two hypotheses, H1 and H2. If H1 accounts 
for [oa + ob] but is  incompatible with [oc], and H2 accounts for all three observations  [oa + ob + oc], then 
[oc] is  the ‘smoking gun’ that discriminates  between two hypotheses  about a historical event. This  one 
downstream effect not only supports  one hypothesis, it works against the alternative hypothesis  (Jeffares 
2008, 471). 
This focus  on individual lines  of evidence makes  clear the importance of auxiliary hypotheses  but 
downplays  the concomitant problem of testing holism. Connecting an extant trace to a hypothesized event 
deep into prehistory, back (say) 65 million years  to the boundary between the Cretaceous  and Paleogene 
periods, requires  many auxiliary hypotheses. These auxiliaries  include assumptions  about the rates  of 
geological and evolutionary processes, the nature of the fossil record, the calibration of instrumentation, 
and, as  Jeffares  (2008) makes  clear, applicable causal regularities. Often these indispensable auxiliaries enjoy 
weak to intermediate epistemic support. And this  raises  the problem of testing holism. Apparent 
disconfirmations of a historical hypothesis  by extant traces  can be explained away by apportioning blame to 
suspect auxiliaries. More problematically, apparent confirmations  of historical hypotheses  can be 
undermined by attacking weaker links  in the chain of auxiliaries. Given that any line of evidence will 
include a number of auxiliaries, and that at least some of the auxiliaries  will lack strong epistemic support, 
there will be a strict limit as to how much epistemic support a smoking gun can provide for a reconstruction. 
We will take a different approach, arguing that the main source of epistemic support in historical 
investigations  comes  from the consilience of multiple independent lines  of evidence on the chronology or 
key quantitative properties integral to causal history. If lines  of evidence that have a high degree of 
independence yield convergent estimates  for the chronology or a quantity assumed by a historical 
reconstruction, then they provide epistemic support that is  less  sensitive to testing holism. The independence 
of evidential inferences  is measured by assessing the amount of overlap between the sets  of assumed 
auxiliaries  required by the different inferences. If inferences are sufficiently independent, attacking one weak 
auxiliary will not completely undermine the overall support for the historical reconstruction. 
Any analysis of the underlying epistemological basis  of scientific inquiry must be carefully rooted in the 
study of actual scientific practice. To this  end, we revisit the impact hypothesis  for the Cretaceous-Paleogene 
(K-Pg) boundary mass  extinction.3 Strong epistemic support derived from smoking guns  has been invoked to 
account for the marked scientific consensus  regarding this  impact event. Our goal is to reassess  the overall 
epistemic support for the impact, and its  proposed causal connection to the cascade of extinctions  at the K-
Pg boundary, in light of the totality of current evidence. As  a result, we pass over several early debates  that 
gradually dissolved as  the field matured. We ultimately dispute the view that a smoking gun-based account 
best captures  the underlying epistemic support for this  historical hypothesis, arguing that closer inspection 
reveals  that the strong support ultimately derives  from the consilience of multiple independent evidential 
inferences. 
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3. Reconstructing the K-Pg Mass Extinction  
Analysis  of the fossilized remains of earlier organisms preserved in geological strata constitutes one of 
our primary means  of epistemic access  to the biogeography and demography of prehistoric species. That 
sedimentary rock strata contain such fossilized flora and fauna, and that these fossils  succeed each other 
vertically in a specific, reliable order that can be identified over wide horizontal distances, was  recognized 
early in the inception of modern geology. Given the so-called law of superposition, the geological principle 
that sedimentary layers  are deposited in a time sequence, with the oldest at the bottom and the youngest on 
the top, these observations  have enabled paleontologists  to roughly measure the extinction of species  over 
time. The K-Pg transition marks  a period of unusually intense turnover in the nature of preserved fossil 
types, with an estimated 60-80% of living species  and half of the genera disappearing at this  boundary 
(Raup 1988). The historical reconstruction of the K-Pg extinction thus seeks to identify the various 
contributing causes underlying this anomaly in the pattern of  preserved fossilized remains. 
The progressive coalescence of robust, independent measures  of geological time in the later 20th 
century established significant new constraints  on any acceptable account of the K-Pg transition. Research 
in this  area is  currently predicated on the idea that the inferred rapid turnover of species  indicates  the 
involvement of processes somehow distinct from those associated with ongoing evolution and extinction. We 
need to enrich our minimal model of macroevolution to explain this  event (Sterelny 2008).4 As  a result, once 
prominent theories  involving the inability of Cretaceous  fauna to adapt to slowly emerging environmental 
pressures, associated with new forms  of competition or gradual climate change, have largely given way to 
hypotheses  involving dramatic, geologically-sudden environmental dislocations. In this  regard, the 
attribution of the End-Cretaceous mass  extinctions  to the effects of the impact of a large earth-crossing 
asteroid (Alvarez et al. 1980) marked a critical turning point in K-Pg extinction research. Although the 
possible involvement of extraterrestrial phenomena in the disruption of End-Cretaceous  biota had been 
previously raised by others—notably De Laubenfels  (1956) and Russell and Tucker (1971)—the Alvarez 
hypothesis  was  unique among such proposals  in that it arose from the consideration of distinctive 
geochemical anomalies  detected at the K-Pg boundary layer. Here we will briefly sketch the accrual of 
epistemic support to the proposal of an End-Cretaceous  impact event via the consilience of multiple 
independent lines of  evidence.5
The critical initial observation that engendered the impact hypothesis  stemmed from a unique 
collaborative effort between Luis Alvarez, a Nobel prize-winning physicist, and his  son Walter, a geologist 
focused on the K-Pg transition. Working together with geochemists  Frank Asaro and Helen Michel, the pair 
initially set out to measure the iridium concentrations in the thin clay of K-Pg boundary layer sections  from 
the Umbrian Apennines  that marked the sudden disappearance of the otherwise abundant fossilized 
remains of marine plankton. The group hoped to exploit recently observed correlations  between 
sedimentation rate and iridium concentration to determine the length of time represented by this  boundary 
layer. Iridium, a siderophile, is largely absent from the Earth’s  crust and upper mantle, but is  much more 
abundant in the meteoric dust that constantly accretes  from outer space. Thus, assuming a constant 
accretion rate, the authors  hoped to use the concentration of iridium in the sediment to infer the length of 
time that sediment took to form. 
Unexpectedly, the Alvarez team discovered a 30-fold enrichment of iridium (from 0.3 to 9.1 ppb) 
coincident with the K-Pg boundary layer. Among the 28 elements  tested, this  effect was  specific for iridium, 
and similar iridium increases  were observed at the boundary layers  of K-Pg samples  from Denmark and 
New Zealand.6 The centimeter-thick clay layer would have taken more than a million years  to form based 
on the proposed meteoric dust accretion model, a duration inconsistent with fledgling radiometric 
measurements  of surrounding strata. Interpretations  that invoked physical or chemical changes  leading to 
extraction of the iridium resident in seawater also seemed problematic. Such accounts  would require 
seawater concentrations  of iridium significantly above those presently observed. Moreover, they suggested 
that the observed iridium anomaly should be accompanied by a compensating depletion of iridium in the 
strata immediately above, which was  not observed. Thus, the K-Pg iridium anomaly constituted an 
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intriguing observation, a telltale trace, representing evidence of an unusual event at the time of the 
extinctions for which none of  the then-current hypotheses could easily account. 
Despite the scattered distribution of examined K-Pg boundary samples, and an inability to completely 
rule out the effects  of unusual depositional or extractive processes, the Alvarez group adopted a working 
hypothesis  that viewed the iridium anomaly as  the result of a sudden influx of extraterrestrial material. They 
adopted the impact hypothesis  rather than a previously advanced scenario involving a nearby supernova 
(Russell and Tucker 1971) for several reasons. First, iridium enrichment stemming from heavy particle 
bombardment due to an exploded star should be accompanied by plutonium-244, which was  not detected in 
any of the K-Pg samples. In addition, isotopic analysis  of K-Pg clay yielded an 191Ir/193Ir ratio within one 
percent of that characteristic of solar system material, providing strong independent evidence that the 
anomalous iridium originated from within the solar system and not from a nearby stellar event. Based on 
these considerations, the authors  concluded that the anomaly arose from the impact of a comet or asteroid, 
which ejected massive amounts  of iridium-rich dust-sized material into the upper atmosphere to be 
dispersed relatively uniformly around the globe. 
Invoking independent data regarding the injection of dust into the stratosphere occasioned by the 1883 
Krakatoa eruption, Alvarez and colleagues  suggested that crater-derived dust would effectively prevent 
sunlight from reaching the Earth’s  surface for a period of several years. This  loss  of sunlight would suppress 
photosynthesis, leading to the collapse of terrestrial and marine food chains. Such a scenario, the authors 
argued, could potentially account for the peculiar taxonomic pattern of K-Pg extinction phenomena. In the 
open ocean, a temporary absence of sunlight would nearly eliminate photosynthetic algae and similarly 
disrupt higher levels  of the food chain such as  foraminifera, ammonites, and marine reptiles. On land, large 
herbivorous  and carnivorous  animals  that were directly or indirectly dependent on photosynthesizing 
vegetation would become extinct, whereas  smaller vertebrates  may have been able to survive by feeding on 
decaying vegetation or insects, and flora would regenerate from seeds, spores, and existing root systems. 
The key geochemical findings of Alvarez’s  Berkeley team were quickly corroborated by reports  from 
several independent groups  (Ganapathy 1980; Kyte 1980; Smit 1980), and provisional adoption of the 
impact hypothesis  inaugurated a new line of research. In the short term, researchers  sought to demonstrate 
that the K-Pg boundary iridium anomaly represented a truly global phenomenon. In the longer term, these 
findings  prompted a reexamination of the K-Pg boundary strata for other residual evidence of a significant 
impact event—most notably, for the distinctive signature of an impact crater. Specifically, the hypothesis 
predicted the presence of other geologic phenomena consistent with a large impact event in the K-Pg 
boundary layer, and that these phenomena would be restricted to this stratigraphic layer. 
These efforts  quickly bore fruit. Within two years, close to forty K-Pg sites  with iridium anomalies were 
reported worldwide, spanning Europe, Asia, Oceania, Africa, and the Americas. Although more than a 
decade passed without the identification of an appropriate impact site, the impact hypothesis  gained 
continuing evidential support from its  ability to account for a growing number of previously unappreciated 
and highly unusual geophysical and geochemical features restricted to the K-Pg boundary layer, including: 
• Anomalous  enrichment of various  metals, including osmium, gold, platinum, rhenium, ruthenium, 
palladium, nickel, and cobalt, in relative proportions  typical of their abundance in chondritic 
meteorites. 
• Spherules, unusual rounded glassy rocks  that are consistent with the solidified remains of sprayed 
drops of  impact melt. 
• Microscopic diamonds  consistent with formation through direct shock alteration of solid material at 
the impact site. Importantly, these minuscule diamonds  are inconsistent with a volcanic origin. Given 
their small size they are unlikely to have survived exposure to the high temperatures of volcanic 
eruptions. Moreover, they remain almost completely free of nitrogen impurities characteristic of 
diamonds originating within the Earth’s mantle. 
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• Shocked quartz and stishovite, which only form at pressures  greater than 8.5 GPa and have been 
associated only with suspected meteoroid impact events and nuclear test sites. 
• Spinal crystals, nickel-rich metal oxide crystals  formed by the melting and rapid solidification of 
metallic samples  in an oxygen-rich environment consistent with the known ablation of meteorites  as 
they enter the Earth’s atmosphere.
Thus, by the late 1980s, the idea of a significant K-Pg impact event provided a single account for a diverse 
array of previously unappreciated geologic and geochemical phenomena, and had encountered no 
anomalous traces. Despite several false alarms, an appropriately dated impact crater—seemingly the most 
straightforward implication of the impact hypothesis—remained unidentified for some time. From early on, 
however, it was  recognized that the preservation of this  critical piece of evidence would be contingent on its 
precise location. At the time of the K-Pg transition nearly two-thirds  of the surface of the Earth consisted of 
oceanic crust, of which nearly 25% has since been displaced via subduction, thereby eliminating historical 
information concerning potential impact craters  in these regions. Finally, Hildebrand and colleagues  (1991) 
announced the discovery of a giant impact crater at the K-Pg boundary near the small Mexican fishing 
village of  Puerto Chicxulub.
Following this  announcement, evidence quickly mounted in support of the idea that the Chicxulub 
Crater marks  the site of the hypothesized K-Pg impact event. Extensive gravimetric profiling to detect subtle 
variations  in local gravity indicates  a crater diameter of 175 to 180 km, matching the estimated impactor 
size calculated by other methods. These gravimetric findings have been further refined through extensive 
magnetic and seismic reflection studies  (e.g., Hildebrand 1995), and confirmed by direct stratigraphic data 
from a number of core samples  derived via exploratory drilling, all of which display characteristic 
mineralogical traces of a substantial impact event. In addition, Swisher and colleagues  (1992) dated the 
Chicxulub Crater to 64.98 ± 0.05 mya as  compared to a measured date of 65.01 ± 0.08 mya for K-Pg 
boundary spherules  using 40Ar/39Ar dating methods. Similarly, melt rock from the Chicxulub core samples 
and K-Pg impact spherules  were found to be isotopically indistinguishable by multi-elemental isotopic 
analysis, strong support that they have a common origin (Blum 1993). 
Given these findings, the scientific community now overwhelmingly endorses  the idea of a late 
Cretaceous  impact at Chicxulub. Objectors  largely confine their criticisms  to issues  regarding the fine-
grained chronology of the extinctions  relative to the Chicxulub impact (e.g., Keller 2004), or seek to 
challenge the ability of the impact hypothesis  to fully account for the selective survival of various species  into 
the Paleogene. In what manner then have researchers overcome the characteristic problem of 
underdetermination faced by historical reconstructions, and in what respects, if at all, do these various 
claims  differ in their epistemic support? Clearly, the explanatory potential and the promise of more 
stringently testing the impact hypothesis  through further empirical study contributed to the decision to 
pursue it as a working hypothesis. Here, however, we aim to assess  the nature of the current overall epistemic 
support for the hypothesis. Thus, rather than offering a historical analysis  of its  acceptance, we focus  on the 
total set of  currently available evidence.  
4. Overcoming the Problem of  Access   
In considering the impact hypothesis  as  an example of successful historical reconstruction, Cleland 
(2002) has  rightly emphasized the crucial importance of the discovery of the anomalous iridium and 
shocked quartz grains  in the widespread acceptance of the account. Given the few known causal 
mechanisms capable of producing these “smoking gun” phenomena, the ability of the impact hypothesis to 
unify them under a single consistent causal story serves  to discriminate this  account from a number of rival 
hypotheses. Indeed, in speaking of the iridium anomaly, Alvarez and colleagues  cite unification as  an 
important virtue of  their hypothesis: 
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None of the current hypotheses  adequately accounts  for this  evidence, but we have developed a 
hypothesis  that appears  to offer a satisfactory explanation for nearly all of the available paleontological 
and physical evidence (1980, 1095). 
Yet, many of the specific claims of the impact hypothesis  are supported by a shared, more complex form of 
evidential reasoning based on the consilience of independent inferences  regarding the specific nature and 
chronology of  hypothesized past events. 
For instance, consider that while trumpeting the unifying potential for the proposed impact scenario, 
Alvarez and colleagues  also devote a considerable portion of their initial report to the estimation of the size 
of the hypothesized impactor. One approach based on the size of the observed K-Pg iridium anomaly and 
the measured abundance of iridium in chondritic meteorites  yielded estimated impactor diameters  between 
6.6 and 14 km. A separate method based on the assumption that the observed 1 cm K-Pg boundary layer is 
composed of ejected impact material that fell from the stratosphere estimated an impactor diameter of 7.5 
km. The authors  deem this  numerical convergence as  significant evidence in favor of the impact scenario, 
highlighting the fact that several independent estimates  of the diameter gave values  that lie within the range 
of  10 ± 4 km. 
Although the authors  never articulate explicitly the underlying reason for their preoccupation with the 
impactor’s  size, their one brief allusion is  revealing: “If we are correct in our hypothesis  that the C-T [sic] 
extinctions  were due to the impact of an earth-crossing asteroid, there are four independent ways  to 
calculate the size of the object” (Alvarez et al. 1980, 1105). The reasoning here is  based on the fact that the 
impact scenario implies  a single defined value for the size of the impacting body. If the iridium anomaly and 
K-Pg boundary clay do represent residual traces  of a common impact event, then to the extent that their 
properties can be used in conjunction with theory-derived causal relations  to infer values  for the size of the 
hypothesized impactor, these values  should agree. To be more precise, to the extent that independent 
inferences from extant data converge onto a single relatively precise range for a hypothesized quantity, they 
provide strong evidence that there is  some definite quantity being measured; the probability that the inferred 
quantity is  indicative of some actual past event or process  increases  as  the number of independent 
inferential paths taken to the inferred value rises. 
Although this  pattern of reasoning might be viewed as  a subspecies  of common cause inference—using 
various  evidential traces  to infer a specific property (as  opposed to the mere existence) of a common cause—
the evidential support provided by this  set of inferences  possesses  features not typically associated with mere 
unification of the available traces  by a common cause.  In this  form of reasoning the power of a theory to 
synthesize multiple lines  of evidential support is  not an extra-empirical virtue but a hallmark of the overall 
degree of support provided by disparate sets  of evidence.7  Moreover, such inferences  to properties  of the 
hypothesized cause reinforce each other by drawing upon distinct auxiliary assumptions. The use of several 
different chains  of auxiliaries  in the inferences  increases  the degree of independence, and thus  decreases the 
chance that they are systematically misleading in a way that would yield the same approximate value for the 
inferred properties  of the causal structure associated with the past event.  Treating the evidential support 
resulting from this  form of reasoning as  mere unification does  not explain the role these type of arguments 
play in science or how they address the problem of  testing holism.
These ideas  trace back to Whewell (1858, 87–88): “The Consilience of Inductions  takes  place when an 
Induction, obtained from one class of facts, coincides  with an Induction, obtained from a different class.” For 
Whewell, consilience—the “jumping together” of inductions  based on different sets of facts—provides  a 
crucial source of confirmation for a scientific hypothesis  (Snyder 2005). While Whewell predicates  his 
discussion of consilience on an idiosyncratic ontology of classes  of facts, we find the general insight 
illuminating for analyzing the accrual of epistemic support for historical reconstructions. We will take 
consilience to be the convergence of lines of evidence for specific claims  or for values  of specific quantities 
that are parts  of a single historical reconstruction.8 Consilience, a composite accrual of different lines  of 
confirmation-theoretic support, thus  constitutes  a, if not the, primary measure of support for historical 
reconstructions of the deep past. While the exact procedure for evaluating consilience is  complex and 
depends on local features of  specific evidential inferences, the measure should have the following features.
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First, the degree of consilience depends on the extent to which the various inferential paths  provide 
converging constraints  on aspects  of the hypothesized event history or chronology. Inferences  that constrain 
aspects  of the chronology or history in ways  that are highly sensitive to the nature of the extant traces 
provide better support, and help minimize the risk that the apparent convergence arises  from the use of 
mistaken auxiliary assumptions. For each distinct inferential path to the aspect of the reconstruction, we can 
assess  the sensitivity of the inference by asking: if the measured property of the relevant extant trace were 
altered, how would the inferred value of the hypothesized historical quantity change? The sensitivity of the 
inference will depend upon both the relevant causal regularities  and the permissible range of values for the 
measured property specified by background theory, and thus  may differ for each distinct inferential path to 
the value of the hypothesized historical quantity. In cases where the inferred quantity is  capable of taking a 
wide range of values  and the inference is  highly sensitive to the relevant properties  of the extant trace (e.g., 
impactor size or date of impact), even coarse-grained consilience on ranges  of the inferred values  provides  a 
significant source of  epistemic support for a hypothesized reconstruction. 
Second, the measure of consilience should also track the degree of independence between the 
inferential pathways  from extant traces  to the hypothesized historical reconstruction, where the degree of 
independence is  determined by the amount of overlap between the sets  of auxiliary hypotheses  invoked by 
the different paths. Obviously, inferences  from extant traces  to events  in the deep past proceed via various 
auxiliary hypotheses, including causal regularities  and commitments  about background conditions  (e.g., the 
typical iridium mass  fractional abundance in chondritic meteorites). In addition, such inferences involve a 
further assumption that the casual system is  (approximately) closed. That is, relevant properties  of the extant 
traces  have not been significantly altered by the action of extraneous intervening causal processes. For an 
isolated inferential path, each of these auxiliaries  bears  the full inferential load—the inferential chain is  only 
as  strong as  its weakest link. Consilience of multiple independent inferences distributes the epistemic load 
across  auxiliaries employed in multiple inferential paths. As  the number of paths  to the inferred aspect of 
the reconstruction increases, the inferential load on auxiliaries that appear in one path lessens  insofar as 
different paths  that rely on different auxiliaries  converge on the same inferred value. Thus, the support 
accruing from consilience rises with increasing independence of the inferential paths. The independence 
between two inferential paths increases as the number of  shared auxiliary hypotheses decreases.
The complete causal chain linking present-day traces  to the deep past is  potentially enormous, and 
many of these factors are likely to remain unknown. One might therefore question how we can possibly 
generate a realistic appraisal of the degree of independence. The details  matter here. The relevant 
background theory provides  inferential strategies  to cope with incomplete information about the causal 
chain by identifying the possible confounding causal processes. By way of illustration, consider the K-Pg 
boundary global iridium anomaly as  the product of consilient inferences. The impact hypothesis  views  the 
iridium increase detected in K-Pg boundary depositions  from widely scattered geographic sites  as  indicative 
of a common origin: the geologically acute influx of extraterrestrial material in the form of a chondritic 
meteor. Given that iridium-rich dust from the impact would be expected to persist in the stratosphere for 
several years and thus  distribute relatively uniformly worldwide, each iridium measurement provides  an 
independent way to estimate the quantity of iridium influx, assuming the measured iridium level has  not 
been significantly affected by extraneous processes.
Clearly, a host of intervening processes  could have acted to alter extant iridium levels. For a given 
iridium measurement, a large number of potential intervening mechanisms  tend to involve geographically 
localized phenomena. Thus, with respect to these possibilities  the assumption that extraneous  processes  have 
not significantly affected the measured iridium level in a given sample is  independent of similar assumptions 
for samples  from different locations. While there is  some geographic variation among iridium measurements, 
there is  a limited consilience from a wide range of locations  that effectively discriminates  a feature of the 
hypothesized historical event (common origin due to impact) from a range of rival possibilities. By contrast, 
for alternative planetary-scale phenomena (e.g., the rapid extraction of the iridium resident in terrestrial 
seawater or heavy particle bombardment from a nearby supernova) that might have acted to alter extant 
iridium levels  in K-Pg boundary strata, the same closed system assumption is  not independent of similar 
assumptions  for samples  from different locations. Different sorts  of evidence are necessary to discriminate 
between rival planetary-scale hypotheses. In the case of the K-Pg iridium anomaly, however, this difficulty is 
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overcome since evidence of such alternative mechanisms  would be expected in currently extant traces  and 
none has been observed (see §3).  
Applying these considerations  to the four methods discussed by Alvarez and colleagues (1980, 1105–
1106) to infer the size of the impacting body, one can see that the stronger inferential approaches  are those 
based on iridium and clay deposition at the boundary layer. Both of these approaches  show a high degree of 
sensitivity. By contrast, the remaining two inferential paths, based on meteor cratering data and light 
attenuation necessary for an “impact winter,” are more conjectural and do not support precise calculations 
regarding the impactor size. The “impact winter” estimates, for example, provide only a rough lower bound 
for the value and are tied to a specific scenario in which light attenuation is  responsible for the resulting 
ecological effects. The two sensitive approaches  involve a number of independent auxiliary hypotheses. 
However, they do share common auxiliary assumptions  about the fraction of impactor material that persists 
in the stratosphere and the absence of extraneous effects  on the composition of the planetary K-Pg clay 
boundary layer.9 None of these methods  are particularly strong in isolation, but the consilience on impactor 
size constrains  possible impact scenarios  in a way that played a key role in the provisional pursuit of the 
impact hypothesis.
Subsequent discovery of the Chicxulub crater provided another independent inferential path that 
supported relatively precise calculations  regarding the size of the hypothesized impactor, effectively 
eliminating any residual debate concerning the origin of the K-Pg iridium anomaly. The inference from the 
extant traces  of the impact crater to the impactor size is  derived from experiments and computer simulation 
studies  showing that an impact crater on Earth should be approximately twenty times  larger than the 
impactor’s  diameter.10 Moreover, the inference of impactor size from the geophysical features  of the 
Chicxulub site proceeds  without reference to the global boundary layer properties, nor does  it invoke the 
behavior of  atmospheric impact debris as in the other inferential methods.
By the time of the identification of the impact site at Chicxulub, the notion of a K-Pg impact event had 
already begun to gain widespread acceptance. This  form of inferential consilience, however, is  by no means 
restricted to the estimation of the impactor’s  size. It was  also employed to constrain significantly the date of 
the impact event. The various  geological traces  cited as  evidence for the impact hypothesis  permitted 
inferences regarding the date of the presumed impact event and those dates  all converged to a narrow range. 
Importantly, these inferred dates  derive not just from traditional lithologic stratigraphy, but also involve 
magnetostratigraphic and radiometric dating methods. Thus, these various methods  constitute multiple 
inferential paths, each with some degree of  independence, to date past occurrences. 
Analogous  approaches  were also employed for a number of other quantities  associated with the putative 
K-Pg impact event, including the chemical composition of the impactor, the location of the impact, and the 
approximate angle of impact. Because the same extant traces  can be used to infer the value of several such 
properties, these inferential ties  allow for the progressive integration of disparate forms of evidence into a 
single unified historical reconstruction in a way that minimizes  undue reliance on strong parsimony 
assumptions. For example, prior to the discovery of the putative impact site at Chicxulub, none of the 
available data were capable of discriminating between a single impact and multiple smaller, geologically 
simultaneous  impact events. However, the discovery of the putative Chicxulub Crater permitted relatively 
independent inferences  regarding the size of the putative impactor and the date of the impact event that 
agreed with similar inferences  derived from the observable properties of the iridium anomaly. This 
agreement supported the notion that the putative impact event that produced the iridium anomaly and the 
impact event that produced the Chicxulub crater were in fact the very same event. As  additional research 
increases  the inferential consilience of the available evidence, we garner more and more support for the 
hypothesis that a single impact event characterized by these various properties actually did take place. 
While the resulting consilience of evidential inferences from different traces  represents  a significant 
constraint on acceptable historical accounts, any single evidential inference deploys a number of auxiliary 
hypotheses  that lack unequivocal support. This  connects  to a problem with the smoking gun concept. If we 
conceive of a smoking gun as  a trace that grounds  an evidential inference capable of unequivocally 
supporting one hypothesis  over current rivals, we must recognize that there is  an inherent limitation on how 
much epistemic support can accrue from a single trace. Adopting a position, as  Cleland does, wherein 
multiple traces are taken collectively as  constituting a smoking gun represents  an insufficient remedy.11 The 
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primary limitation of such an approach is  that it leaves  the connections  of underlying inferential relations 
between traces  unanalyzed, thereby failing to explicate the nature of the overall epistemic support for a 
historical reconstruction. While it may be the case that “it was  widely conceded that the anomalous  iridium 
and shocked quartz provided a ‘smoking gun’”(Cleland 2002, 483), this characterization does little to 
illuminate how the complex inferential connections  between these two sets  of traces  provide epistemic 
support for the impact hypothesis; the consilience between sets  of traces is  also epistemologically salient. 
Moreover, the smoking guns  themselves  are the product of consilient inductions. Even the multiple 
anomalous iridium traces  only serve as  a smoking gun because of the consilience, on both the date and 
relative magnitude difference of the iridium spikes, among samples  taken from around the globe. Thus, the 
structure of actual epistemic support for the hypothesized K-Pg impact events  consists  in a complex nested 
series  of overlapping consilient inferences. To the extent that the smoking gun account ignores  the nature of 
these underlying inferential relations between evidential traces, it ultimately understates  the evidence in favor 
of  a significant End-Cretaceous impact event.
As many have recognized, claims regarding the exact nature of the impacting body are separate from 
the central claim concerning the causal connection between the impact and the mass  extinction. The 
peripheral claims about the impact are elaborated and defended in order to support the hypothesis  that a 
significant End-Cretaceous  impact event was  an actual and major contributing cause of the K-Pg mass 
extinction. We turn now to the epistemic support for this  causal connection. The residual controversy on this 
point illustrates the epistemic limitations of  historical reconstruction.  
5. Refining Reconstructions, Uncovering Limitations    
The claim that the Chicxulub impact was a significant cause of the K-Pg mass  extinction is  the same 
sort of historical claim as  those involving the origin of the K-Pg iridium anomaly. Consilience on the 
chronology and inferred historical properties  of the extinction phenomena from independent inferential 
paths  potentially provides  the epistemic support for the hypothesized causal relationship between the impact 
and the extinctions. Alterations  in the nature of the putative impact event would imply changes in the 
ecological pattern or timing of the resulting extinctions, and those would have corresponding implications 
for the extant fossil record, thereby allowing for two independent inferential paths to the hypothesized 
extinction phenomena. The first path relies  on an analysis  of the abundance, biogeography, and 
morphology of fossilized taxa to assess  the ecological changes  coincident with the K-Pg transition. The 
second path utilizes  reconstructed parameters of the hypothesized impact event in conjunction with 
ecological regularities to independently infer the nature of  these same late Cretaceous ecological disruptions. 
Given the proposed causal relationship, one implication of the impact hypothesis  is  that impact-induced 
extinctions  should coincide with (or perhaps  slightly postdate) the timing of the K-Pg impact event. Some 
extinctions  fit this  predicted pattern. The iridium anomaly has  been found to coincide stratigraphically with 
the disappearance of several Cretaceous  pollen species  (Orth 1981). Similarly, the fossilized remains  of 
normally abundant single-celled foraminifera drop to almost undetectable levels  within millimeters  of the 
impact iridium in K-Pg marine strata (Smit 1982). The extinctions  of many terrestrial plant species  also 
appear to fit the impact scenario (Nichols  and Johnson 2008). In this  respect there is  good evidence that the 
impact caused some extinctions. 
The impact hypothesis, however, is  typically interpreted to extend beyond this  narrow claim to include 
the claim that all (or very nearly all) of the terminal Cretaceous  extinctions  can be attributed to the 
consequences  of the impact event (Schulte et al. 2010a). Indeed, the impact hypothesis initially attracted so 
much attention and has  been pursued with such vigor because it offered a single mechanism by which to 
account for the anomalously high number of K-Pg boundary extinctions inferred from the observed fossil 
record. Yet, prima facie, the fossil evidence does  not support such a broad claim, showing an uneven 
disappearance of most taxa from the fossil record prior to the K-Pg impact. This  incongruity between the 
impact chronology and the fossil record is  problematic because there are alternative causes, such as  severe 
Deccan trap volcanism at the K-Pg boundary, which may have contributed to the mass  extinction (Duncan 
and Pyle 1988; Keller et al. 2008). Controversy over whether the mass extinction has  a single cause (impact) 
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or multiple causes (impact, volcanism, etc.) continues (Archibald et al. 2010; Courtillot and Fluteau 2010; 
Keller et al. 2010; Schulte et al. 2010b). 
Owing to the pervasive effects  of information-destroying processes, neither the first nor the last 
organism in a given taxon will be recorded as  a fossil. This  raises  the question of whether the recorded 
ranges  of fossils  can be used to discriminate between gradual and simultaneous extinction hypotheses at a 
sufficiently fine-grained level of analysis. To address  this question Signor and Lipps  (1982) built a simple 
model for fossilization probability based on a Poisson distribution, showing that we should expect significant 
variation across  taxa in the time interval between the last observed fossil and the actual extinction time. The 
situation here is  structurally similar to one discussed by Sober (2008, 318–323) concerning the evidential 
import of the presence or absence of a fossil intermediate for the question of common ancestry versus 
separate ancestry. Using Sober’s  framework, we can formulate the evidentiary situation for observed 
extinctions in the fossil record as follows. 
For a set of two species  consider two possible hypotheses: either they share a common catastrophic 
extinction (CE) or they suffered separate gradual extinctions  (SE). The two hypotheses  provide different 
answers  to the question of whether individuals  of that species  existed at the time of the putative mass 
extinction event. CE entails  that they must have existed, while SE entails  only that they may have (extinction 
may occur before or after the catastrophe). The situation is  complicated, however, by the nature of the fossil 
record. We can only observe fossils  and, due to information destruction, these traces  provide only a rough 
guide for the actual time of extinction. If there is  a significant time interval between the last observed fossil 
(LOF) for a species  and the mass extinction event (MEE), then there is  a potential conflict between the 
separate inferential paths  to the extinction chronology. It appears  that this extinction fails  to cohere with the 
pattern proposed by CE. 
Let tLOF be the time (in mya) of the LOF and tMEE be the time (in mya) of the MEE. For the sake of the 
argument, assume that after accounting for observational error tLOF > tMEE (i.e., there exists  a significant 
detectable time interval between LOF and MEE). For a given species, we want to know whether the species 
existed at some intermediate time tX, where tLOF > tX > tMEE. For CE we know that: 
P(species exists at tX |CE) = 1 
P(species does not exist at tX |CE) = 0 
For SE the species  may have existed at tX; let us  say this occurs  with probability q (directly analogous to 
Sober’s probability q). 
q = P(species exists at tX |SE) 
1 − q  = P(species does not exist at tX |SE) 
Just because a species exists  at tX does  not mean that we will be able to search and find a fossil dated tX. So let 
us define the probability a (directly analogous to Sober’s probability a) as follows: 
a = P(find fossil dated tX |CE and species exists at tX) = P(find fossil dated tX |SE and species exists at tX) 
We can now construct a likelihood ratio for the case where we search and fail to find a fossil dated tX.12
P(we do not find a fossil dated tX |SE) / P(we do not find a fossil dated tX |CE) = (1 – qa) / (1 – a)
The likelihood ratio has  some interesting implications. Given the assumption that tLOF > tMEE, searching and 
failing to observe a fossil from an intermediate time tX almost always  provides evidence for SE over CE.13 
The strength of evidence (for SE over CE) depends  on the values of q and a. The probability q depends  on 
the exact extinction mechanism presumed by SE, but there are some general constraints: q is  directly 
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proportional to tX − tMEE (i.e., as  tX gets  closer to tLOF the probability it exists at that time given SE increases), 
and we can assume that q  < 1 because we do not have definitive evidence that the species exists  at tX . The 
probability a depends  on fossilization processes  and our observational capabilities, and varies  based on a set 
of species-specific factors, such as physiology, geographical range, and population size. Importantly, for most 
cases of interest (where tLOF > tMEE and q and a have plausible values for K-Pg extinction phenomena), the 
choice between SE and CE will be underdetermined.14 
Assuming differing fossilization probabilities  between species, Signor and Lipps demonstrate that in 
cases of common mass  extinctions  one should expect significant variation in the time interval between the 
last observed fossil and the actual extinction time for various  species. Similarly, apparently sudden 
disappearances  in the fossil record can be artifacts  of geographical range reductions or population 
bottlenecks. This  so-called Signor-Lipps  effect provides  a means by which the gradual disappearance of taxa 
from the fossil record prior to the impact date need not be viewed as  disconfirming the hypothesis of a 
simultaneous  impact-triggered mass extinction event. Yet this  effect also places  a significant limitation on the 
historical reconstruction of this  event, entailing that the extant traces  of uncommon taxa not represented by 
a continuous fossil record may ultimately be inadequate to discriminate between gradual and simultaneous 
extinction hypotheses at a sufficiently fine-grained level of  analysis. 
Due to their prevalence and reliable fossilization, data on pollen and foraminifera overcome the 
underdetermination generated by the Signor-Lipps  effect—the a values  for pollen and foraminiferans are 
much greater than those for most dinosaurs. Insofar as the inferred extinction dates  for these species, derived 
either from their disappearance from the fossil record or the date of the hypothesized impact event, 
converge to a single, relatively precise value (Alvarez et al. 1980; Orth et al. 1981; Smit and Hertogen 1980; 
Smit 1982), this  approach provides  significant evidence in support of the claim that the impact is  an actual 
contributing cause for at least some End-Cretaceous  extinctions. By contrast, the stronger claim that the 
Chicxulub impact is  the major cause of the full scope of K-Pg boundary extinctions receives  little direct 
support from the broader chronology of extinctions  inferred from the fossil record. The observed pattern of 
species loss  may be consistent with this  hypothesis insofar as  fossilized remains of various  taxa are not found 
after the impact event, but underdetermination of the timing of extinction relative to the impact event for 
many species presents a significant challenge for attempts to obtain high-quality evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. Ingenious  methods  to access  the potential environmental effects  of the impact have uncovered 
abundant geophysical and geochemical data consistent with the occurrence of tsunamis, wildfires, acid rain, 
and climate-altering gas  emissions  expected to result from the hypothesized impact (Kring 2007)—
consequences  certain to negatively affect a late Cretaceous biota. However, in the absence of a well-
supported chronology establishing that many End-Cretaceous  extinctions  did not take place prior to the K-
Pg impact event, these findings do little to support the strong version of  the impact scenario. 
In general, advocates  of the strong version of the impact hypothesis  have adopted an alternative 
approach to support their claims, arguing that the impact scenario is  uniquely able to account for the breadth 
and selectivity of the K-Pg extinctions. If we invoke the Signor-Lipps  effect to fix the timing of all End-
Cretaceous  extinctions to the same geologic instant, we are faced with a peculiarly selective mass  extinction. 
The scale of biological turnover is  massive, with a number of major animal groups  disappearing such as 
non-avian dinosaurs, marine and flying reptiles, and ammonites  (Fastovsky and Sheehan 2005). But 
crocodilians  and avian dinosaurs  persisted, and other groups  (e.g., benthic foraminifera) showed negligible 
extinctions  (Thomas  2007). In effect, the suggestion that the consequences of the Chicxulub impact can 
account for the scope and selectivity of these ecological changes  amounts to another consilience claim. 
However, upon close consideration the practical prospects  of utilizing the inferred nature of the 
hypothesized impact event to support detailed reconstructions  of the pattern of resulting K-Pg extinctions 
currently appears  dim. Fossil and geochemical evidence do not yet support the necessary fine-grained 
reconstruction of late Cretaceous ecology. Moreover, we currently lack the theoretical basis  necessary to 
infer the precise nature of the causal relationships  between properties  of the impact event and specific 
climatological and ecological consequences (Pierazzo et al. 2003; Kring 2007). 
The problem is  compounded by the complexity of ecology, and the extreme sensitivity of the effects  of 
the impact on a plethora of  environmental and ecological factors is well appreciated: 
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The environmental consequences of an impact event and any subsequent biological effects  rely on 
several factors, including the ambient environmental conditions  and the extant ecosystem structures  at 
the time of impact. Some of the severest environmental perturbations of the Chicxulub impact event 
would not have been significant in some periods  of Earth history. Consequently, the environmental and 
biological effects  of an impact event must be evaluated in the context in which it occurs  (Kring 2003, 
133). 
While advocates  of the strong version of the impact hypothesis  have appealed to factors  such as  the 
potential protective effects  of habitat, feeding strategy, body weight, endothermy, and population size to 
account for the distinctive selectivity of the apparent mass  extinction, the insensitivity of the presumed 
impact scenario to revisions  in the pattern of late Cretaceous extinctions  (see, e.g., Marshall 1996) betrays 
the tentative and vague nature of these speculations. Thus, we are still not in a position to utilize geophysical 
findings  to stringently test the role of the impact in the distinctive ecological pattern of K-Pg extinctions. 
Perhaps  this  will change with the further resolution of paleoecology and the development of more realistic 
ecological models  of the late Cretaceous, but for now we must acknowledge the severe limitations  of this 
alternative approach.15
The limitations  uncovered here present a significant difficulty for the strong claim that the impact is 
responsible for nearly all K-Pg boundary extinctions. In this  case the precise, consilient, independent 
evidential inferences  characteristic of the reconstruction of the impact event are absent. Instead, the support 
for this  causal claim rests  on a potential circularity: in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the 
hypothesized impact event is  used to fix the timing of extinction for all End-Cretaceous biota, whereas  the 
justification of the impact event as  the cause of the extinction phenomena is  based on its  ability to account 
for the resulting geologically-instantaneous  mass  extinction. Given the available evidence for a significant 
late Cretaceous  impact and its  apparent effects  on various  plant and foraminifera species, the strong version 
of the impact hypothesis  is  certainly plausible and consistent with the data. However, evidence indicates  that 
other massive geological processes  such as catastrophic volcanism and marine regression operated during the 
late Cretaceous, which may have contributed to the K-Pg biological turnover (MacLeod 2003). Thus, while 
there is  little doubt that an impact played some role in these extinctions, the available data currently fail to 
discriminate between the strong impact hypothesis  and that of multiple smaller, temporally proximate 
extinction events, or those involving a requisite role for other geological processes. This  lingering uncertainty 
is  reflected on the ongoing controversy concerning models  in which the Chicxulub impact constitutes the 
sole cause of  the K-Pg mass extinction.
6. Conclusion   
We have defended a view of historical reconstruction wherein the consilience of multiple independent 
lines  of evidence on the chronology and key quantities  integral to a specific historical reconstruction 
provides  the main source of epistemic support. Unlike the smoking gun account, this  approach is  specifically 
sensitive to the problem of testing holism. The consilience of several such inferences  involving distinct 
auxiliary hypotheses  onto a relatively precise range of values serves  to crosscheck the auxiliaries  employed in 
any one inference, simultaneously testing the legitimacy of all of these background assumptions, and thereby 
allowing for a stronger conclusion regarding the nature of  the inferred past cause of  the observed data.16 
Cleland takes  a metaphysical feature of causation to make the smoking gun epistemology viable. Due to 
the time asymmetry of overdetermination—that events  in the causal web tend to have many more 
downstream effects than upstream contributing causes—historical scientists can: 
proliferate alternative explanations for the traces  they observe and then search for a smoking gun to 
discriminate among them. The overdetermination of the past by the localized present provides  the 
rationale for this  work, ensuring that the probability of finding such traces is fairly high (Cleland 2002, 494–495, 
our emphasis). 
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In effect, Cleland claims that metaphysics  makes the probability of successful scientific inquiry into events 
from the deep past “fairly high” (where success  is  understood as  finding a smoking gun). As stated, this  is 
problematic. Although the proliferation of downstream effects  helps  and is  perhaps  a necessary condition for 
successful reconstruction, the problem is  that this  metaphysical overdetermination is  compatible with 
epistemic underdetermination (Turner 2005, 215–216). There are many factors that affect, and usually 
confound, the overall probability of success  for scientific inquiry into the past. Processes  can destroy 
information, removing the downstream traces  of earlier causes. As the case of fossils  clearly shows, the 
preservation of traces  is  contingent and often biased. Also, the ability of scientists  to find smoking gun traces 
depends  on the instrumentation and background theories  at hand, as well as  on the specificity of the 
hypotheses  under consideration. Finally, the sheer difficulty of reconstructing the deep past, as  evidenced by 
the history of science, supports  the claim that the probability of success  is  rather low. Causes  have many 
downstream effects, but the probability of successful inquiry also depends  on the preservation and detection 
of  those downstream effects. 
By this  criticism we do not mean to discount the disproportionate role of particular evidential traces  in 
the formulation of historical reconstructions. Because ordinary phenomena can result from the action of 
any number of distinct causal processes, some anomalous  finding indicative of a particular process—a 
telltale trace—is  typically required to gain some inferential purchase on past events. Specifically, a telltale 
trace helps  constrain the possible events  or processes  capable of producing it, ideally to a small number. 
Given current background theories, shocked quartz grains, and to a lesser extent the iridium anomaly, 
constitute such telltale traces. But the strong epistemic support for a historical reconstruction involves  much 
more than telltale traces; it involves  integrating aspects  of the telltale traces within a chronology and a 
network of closely interrelated theoretical quantities  relevant to the history. This is  how the consilience of 
inferential relations  enables  such telltale traces  to provide epistemic support for the larger reconstructed 
history of  a late Cretaceous Chicxulub impact. 
Put more generally, whether some trace counts  as  a smoking gun depends  primarily on historical and 
sociological context rather than epistemic factors. In particular, a trace gains the status  of a smoking gun 
when the state of research at a time is  such that one evidential inference convinces  a number of scientists  to 
accept the hypothesis. However, behind the smoking gun is  a variety of research that provides  multiple 
consilient lines  of evidence that accrue sufficient epistemic support such that one additional line of evidence 
pushes  many scientists  over their individual thresholds for acceptance. Thus, although perhaps salient to a 
historical account of theory acceptance within a particular field, the smoking gun account obscures  the 
nature of the underlying inferential relations  between evidential traces  that provide epistemic support for a 
historical reconstruction. 
The consilience of multiple inferences  to a single parameter is  a commonplace strategy used to support 
theoretical claims  in areas  outside of historical reconstruction. For example, Salmon (1984, 213–227) argues 
that the convergence of independent inferences on Avogadro’s  number was the source of epistemic support 
that led to the widespread acceptance of the atomic hypothesis  in physics. Morgan (1934) made an 
argument for the reality of genes based on a similar sort of evidential convergence that fits  the kind of 
consilience we defend here. Janssen (2002) provides several additional cases  from the history of science 
where a general consilience style of  reasoning is used to provide epistemic support for scientific claims.  
While consilience provides  a good source of epistemic support for claims pursued in any line of 
scientific inquiry, conditions  for accruing support for historical reconstructions  through consilience are strict. 
Not only does  the approach depend on the availability of extant data that can serve as  inputs for necessary 
auxiliaries  to invoke causal generalizations that are projectable back in time, but the data must also support 
multiple independent inferential paths  to various  hypothesized quantities associated with these past events. 
Furthermore, because this  method is  grounded on the presumption that inferences  based on mistaken 
assumptions  will not yield the same value for the parameter of interest, the epistemic power of this  approach 
is  only realized in cases  where the different inferential lines  have a sufficient degree of independence, and 
yield estimated values and chronologies  associated with the historical reconstruction that are highly sensitive 
to the precise nature of the extant traces. Nor can the consilience of multiple lines  of inference be taken as 
sufficient support to definitively establish a given historical reconstruction. This  strategy can be progressively 
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undermined by the need to appeal to coincidence—invoking a precise set of historical conditions  that are 
unsupported by independent lines of evidence in order to account for all available evidentiary traces. The 
strong version of the impact hypothesis that must appeal to a precise, if ill-defined, set of environmental 
conditions  to account for the hypothesized pattern of impact-related ecological disruptions that purportedly 
caused almost all the K-Pg extinctions  exemplifies this  appeal to coincidence. Likewise, the presence of 
anomalous traces  undercuts  epistemic support garnered by the consilience strategy in the absence of a 
mitigating account of the phenomena. For example, the disappearance of various  taxa from the fossil record 
prior to the hypothesized impact event is  a prima facie anomalous  trace, but the Signor-Lipps  effect largely 
mitigates  this  anomaly by accounting for differences between fossil dates  and actual extinction dates. Finally, 
in isolation, the consilience approach does  little to address  the possibility that information-destroying 
processes  have rendered the available fragmentary traces  systematically misleading. The threat of such a 
possibility must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
Detailed reconstruction of the deep past is  difficult, as evidenced by the history of science. Even in cases 
where the relevant causal processes fall within well-defined theoretically mature domains, historical 
reconstruction often proves  extremely challenging. A line of historical inquiry overcomes the persistent 
problem of access  to achieve substantial epistemic authority not only by identifying one or more anomalous 
telltale traces, but also by isolating a substantial body of high-quality data that supports multiple 
independent inferences  about the properties  of past events  in the hypothesized causal network. Given these 
challenges, it is  perhaps  not unexpected that the pace of historical reconstruction in some contexts  lags 
behind scientific inquiry into phenomena that occur regularly or repeatedly.
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Notes
1.  The term “historical reconstruction” should be understood broadly to encompass causal investigations into both 
individual spatiotemporally compact past events (e.g.,  a particular extraterrestrial impact event) and temporally 
extended sequences  of past events (e.g., determining the effects  of an extraterrestrial impact on the late Cretaceous 
flora and fauna). This differs from another typical task in science:  the identification of regularities (laws of nature 
or otherwise). The latter treats specific events as instances of general patterns, rather than as targets  of 
investigation. Some, notably Cleland (2001, 2002),  distinguish between two different prototypical approaches to 
science: historical and experimental.  However, it would be mistaken to view these distinctive scientific tasks as 
mapping directly onto traditional scientific disciplines, for most have both experimental and historical aspects. As 
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Jeffares  (2008) persuasively argues, paradigmatic historical sciences—such as paleobiology, archaeology, and 
geology—make extensive use of regularities, and often construct models with the aim of identifying new 
regularities. Turner (2009) makes the case that part of paleobiology involves testing distribution hypotheses about 
large-scale patterns rather than causal reconstructions. And paradigmatic experimental sciences  often engage in 
historical reconstruction. Early universe cosmology, for example, focuses on the reconstruction of the first few 
minutes of the universe, and such reconstruction cannot be disentangled from the theoretical innovations and 
identified regularities in current particle physics (Smeenk 2003; Weinberg 2008).
2. Sober (1988, 3–4) made this point early on. Systems  with multiple local equilibria preserve more information about 
initial conditions  than those with a single global equilibrium. Beatty and Desjardins (2009) continue this sort of 
analysis  and reveal further complications for reconstructing evolutionary history by investigating the sensitivity of 
natural selection to other evolutionary factors.
 
3.	 Formerly known as  the Cretaceous-Tertiary (K-T) extinction, the Tertiary period has  since been divided into the 
Paleogene and Neogene periods.
 
4. 	 In the interest of brevity we background several factors  here. Attributing disappearance from the fossil record to 
species extinction represents a significant inference beyond the available data, displayed in cases such as 
coelacanths. Moreover, even granting that disappearance from the fossil record might be reasonably equated with 
extinction, the disappearance of many taxa within a specific level of the sedimentary record need not necessarily 
imply rapid extinction in a manner that could not be accounted for solely by basal evolution. Lyell (1868), for 
example, viewed such discontinuities  in the fossil record as mere gaps in the sedimentary record,  where long 
periods of time had not been recorded,  or were erased by erosion, and thus gave the mistaken impression of 
abrupt radical change. Thus, from a uniformitarian perspective, to the extent to which the spike in apparent 
extinction intensity at the K-Pg transition demands  explanation, the account to be provided concerns alterations in 
the sedimentation rate, not alterations in the extinction rate. Only with the relatively recent establishment of robust 
independent measures of  geological time were these underdetermination problems overcome.
5. 	 For more detailed historical accounts  of this research and the surrounding controversy, see Alvarez (1997), Powell 
(1998), and Frankel (1999).
6.  Iridium concentrations from the three samples showed substantial variation (from 9.1 ± 0.5 ppb in the Italian 
samples to 41.6 ± 1.8 ppb in the Danish samples). However,  the measured values all represented ≥20-fold increases 
over background levels observed in surrounding strata.
7. 	 However, see Myrvold (2003) for a modified Bayesian model that renders  unification as an empirical virtue.  Also, 
see Stegenga (2009) for a more skeptical view on syntheses of  multiple sources of  evidence.
8.  Turner (2007) discusses the role of consilience in historical sciences, but his treatment differs from ours. For Turner, 
consilience is a kind of explanatory unification, and while it may carry some weight in theory choices (Turner 
suggests  that it can be used to “break evidential ties  between rival hypotheses”),  we should remain skeptical about 
consilience because there will often be “equally consilient” rivals to choose between (2007, 203). We want to avoid 
equating consilience with simple unification, for we see consilience as a thoroughly empirical virtue—it is the 
synthesis  of multiple lines  of evidential support, and therefore an empirical measure.  In addition, treating 
consilience as unification does not explain the role consilience-type arguments play in addressing the problem of 
testing holism. Along these lines, although not explicitly discussing the independence of contributing inferences, 
Janssen (2002) provides an account of consilience as the combination of multiple common cause inferences,  or 
“common origin inferences.” He argues  that these “meta-common origin inferences” have played a crucial role in 
the history of science, discussing Copernicus, Kepler,  and Poincaré on the rotation of the Earth as well as styles  of 
argument found in Newton, Whewell,  and Darwin. See also Harper (1989) for an analysis  of consilience in 
Newton’s  argument for universal gravitation.  Furthermore, consilience considerations extend to inductive methods 
beyond common cause inferences. Consider the importance of estimating quantities relevant to historical 
reconstruction with greater and greater precision (e.g., the K-Pg impactor size,  specific chronological dates  using 
radiometric methods, dates of  evolutionary divergence using molecular methods, etc.).
9.  The two approaches  share an estimate for the fraction of impact material that initially persisted in the stratosphere. 
Termed the “Krakatoa fraction” after the eruption that provided an estimate of the parameter, the value 0.22 was 
used despite the different character of the two explosions because it was the only relevant number then available. 
However, because of the way this  term enters into the two inferences, the inferred impactor sizes obtained with the 
two methods converge regardless  of the specific value employed. Thus, with respect to the consilience obtained 
using these two approaches, the shared assumption only consists in the more modest claim that the behavior of 
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iridium-rich ejected impact material in the atmosphere approximates  that of other impact ejecta. Once we 
consider the convergence of inferred impactor sizes using these approaches with that obtained using Chicxulub 
cratering data, however, the specific value employed from the Krakatoa fraction again becomes relevant.
10. 	The inferred impactor diameter varies  linearly with the size of the measured impact crater, yielding an estimated 
impactor diameter of  9-10 km.
11. Cleland explicitly endorses the idea of multiple traces jointly constituting a smoking gun. As Cleland (2002, 480–
481) defines it:  “A smoking gun is a trace(s) that unambiguously discriminates  one hypothesis from among a set of 
currently available hypotheses as providing ‘the best explanation’ of the traces thus far observed.” For the impact 
hypothesis, she views the combination of  the iridium anomaly and shocked quartz as a smoking gun.
12. 	Following standard confirmation theories, we will assume that the observations confirm the hypothesis that confers 
the higher likelihood on such observations over alternative hypotheses that confer lower likelihoods.
13. The only exception to this generalization involves  extreme cases where q  ´ = 1 or a  ´= 0. This entails  a likelihood 
ratio of  1 and so the data have no evidential import in these cases.
 
14. 	For illustration, suppose SE entails q = 0.1 and that our fossil finding methods entail a = 0.1; then the likelihood 
ratio is  a mere 1.1. Given all the factors  that affect q and a, this is  weak evidence indeed. Notice that a varies across 
species due to factors such as population size, geographical range, or fossilization potential.
15. 	The sensitivity of the impact-induced ecological effects to a host of environmental and ecological factors  also 
undermines another strategy sometimes invoked to support the strong version of the impact hypothesis: that the K-
Pg boundary exemplifies  a general causal regularity linking significant impact events to terrestrial mass extinction 
phenomena. In this regard, while scattered traces  do connect impact events to periods of rapid species turnover, 
any correlation between these phenomena remains  weak (Alvarez 2003). Moreover, even advocates of such a 
correlation readily grant that evidence for a potential causal relationship is  strongest in the case of the K-Pg 
boundary extinctions.
16. 	Rich, complex Bayesian models of epistemology, such as  hierarchical models (Henderson et al. 2010) or modified 
unification models (Myrvold 2003),  provide a point of departure for constructing a formal model of consilience, 
which should help further clarify the role of  consilience in science.
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